Self-organized evolution in a socio-economic environment by Arenas, Àlex et al.
PHYSICAL REVIEW E APRIL 2000VOLUME 61, NUMBER 4Self-organized evolution in a socioeconomic environment
A. Arenas,1 A. Dı´az-Guilera,2 C. J. Pe´rez,2 and F. Vega-Redondo3
1Departament d’Enginyeria Informa`tica, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Carretera Salou s/n, E-43006 Tarragona, Spain
2Departament de Fı´sica Fonamental, Universitat de Barcelona, Diagonal 647, E-08028 Barcelona, Spain
3Facultad de Econo´micas and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Econo´micas, Universidad de Alicante, E-03071 Alicante, Spain
~Received 26 May 1999!
We propose a general scenario to analyze technological changes in socio-economic environments. We
illustrate the ideas with a model that incorporating the main trends is simple enough to extract analytical results
and, at the same time, sufficiently complex to display a rich dynamic behavior. Our study shows that there
exists a macroscopic observable that is maximized in a regime where the system is critical, in the sense that the
distribution of events follow power laws. Computer simulations show that, in addition, the system always
self-organizes to achieve the optimal performance in the stationary state.
PACS number~s!: 87.23.Ge, 02.50.Le, 05.65.1b, 87.23.KgThe evolution of socioeconomic environments is attract-
ing the interest of the physics community due to the inherent
complexity of many dynamic processes. In particular, con-
cepts and tools widely used in nonequilibrium statistical
physics have proved to be quite useful when studying the
complex behavior of interacting economic agents @1–3#.
There are clear evidences that social and economic
change in modern societies typically come in ‘‘waves’’ with
seemingly little intertemporal structure. There are many fac-
tors that can contribute to such complex evolution but, in
essence, any theory able to account for the inherent dynam-
ics of the phenomenon should consider how the stimulus for
change spreads by gradual local interaction through a social
network as well as the incentives that govern individual be-
havior @4–7#. The hope is that, independently of the particu-
lar choice for the microscopic rules describing the dynamic
behavior of the agents that form an arbitrary system, one
should observe some collective trends that could be reflected
in terms of macroscopic observables.
In this paper, our main goal is to define a general scenario
that could be useful to understand evolution in socioeco-
nomic environments and within such a broad field our con-
cern is related to technological progress. In a general sense,
let us consider a population of agents each of them interact-
ing with a group of neighbors in order to carry out projects
of mutual interest. From these collaborations agents obtain
payoffs which, of course, tend individually to be as large as
possible. To be more precise these payoffs should reflect sev-
eral basic properties. First, they should account for a basic
benefit obtained just for having a certain technological level.
It might be thought as an index for the technological poten-
tial productivity. It is reasonable to assume that the higher
the technological level the larger the base payoff will be.
Furthermore, it should measure how similar the tools re-
quired to undertake a mutual project are. It should favor
those collaborations where both technological levels are very
similar ~high compatibility! and punish any waste of re-
sources derived from a possible mismatch between them. In
other words, technological compatibility should induce high
values of the payoff function while significant costs should
arise from any degree of incompatibility @8#. It is also rea-
sonable to assume that those costs are bounded from below
~the bankrupt!.PRE 611063-651X/2000/61~4!/3466~4!/$15.00The dynamics must be consequent with the aforemen-
tioned basic trends. Two main ingredients contribute to the
dynamical evolution. One is the interaction with the rest of
the population. Each agent should have the possibility to
modify her technological level if the benefits derived from
this change are increased. With only this term the system
might reach a quiescent state where all the agents are happy
with their respective technological level, not necessarily the
same for all of them. To complete the picture, it is also
natural to think of individual mechanisms of technological
improvement which could be modeled as a sudden update of
the state of a given agent. This change plays the role of a
perturbation and admits several interpretations ~e.g., local in-
novation, a shock in payoffs, population renewal, etc.!. Im-
mediately, her nearest neighbors check whether an update to
a new technological state is more profitable for them. The
process can be extended all over the network triggering a
wave of change or avalanche till a new quiescent state is
reached. Then, the sequence of events is repeated again. No-
tice that in modern socioeconomic environments, the diffu-
sion of information and technology is usually a fast process
while advances are developed in a much slower time scale.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that both processes are
defined in different time scales. Other ingredients can also be
incorporated into this general framework but, up to now, let
us keep this simple picture in mind.
Next point concerns the characterization of progress.
More precisely, we need to measure things in terms of a
macroscopic observable. Accounting for the rate of advance,
the most natural choice is the mean velocity of progress,
which can be defined as
r5 lim
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, ~1!
where s(t) is the number of agents involved in the avalanche
generated at time t, and H(t) is the total advance induced by
the wave on the whole population. Assuming that each indi-
vidual update induces a certain cost, r also measures the3466 © 2000 The American Physical Society
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nological level. For instance, a high advance rate will imply
to achieve some given level at minimum total cost, i.e., with
the minimal number of individual updates.
Several questions arise in a natural manner. For a given
system defined in such scenario, is there any kind of behav-
ior which could optimize r? If this is the case, how does the
system evolve towards the optimal state?
Let us steer the intuition of the reader with a physical
discussion on the basis of the scenario proposed so far. If the
cost of an update is very small, then all agents are willing to
adopt the best available technology and any new particular
improvement will immediately be diffused through the
whole population, leading to an avalanche involving a large
number of individuals, eventually the whole system. In con-
trast, in the opposite case it is generally difficult to find an
agent interested in changing her current state since even if a
rather advanced technology is available, the cost will typi-
cally be too high leading to a situation where avalanches
tend to be very small. These two extreme situations can be
identified with a supercritical or subcritical regime, respec-
tively. In both cases the advance rate defined in Eq. ~1! tends
to be independent of the number of agents n. From a theo-
retical standpoint one might expect that in the intermediate
range the most interesting phenomena can emerge since it is
where rich dynamic behavior may flourish. In this regime,
we expect that a substantial degree of heterogeneity ~but one
that can be eventually broken by the advance of technologi-
cal avalanches! plays a fundamental role.
Once one knows the distribution of s and H then it is
straightforward to work out r and determine if there is any
specific regime where the performance of a given system is
optimal. There are plenty of evidences reported in the litera-
ture showing that quantities such as s and H follow power
law distributions @1,9–15#. Therefore, we assume that the
avalanche-size distribution obeys a power law P(s);1/sg,
for some g.0, as well as the distribution of technological
advances per avalanche P(H);1/Hb for some positive b . In
addition, we take the natural assumption of considering that
avalanche sizes and induced advances should also be related,
on average, through some power relationship of the form
H;sa ~2!
with a>1. Notice that the lower bond a51 corresponds to
the two aforementioned extreme situations: either a uniform
growing front ~supercritical! or hardly interacting agents
~subcritical!. It can be easily shown that, provided g and b
are larger than 1, the following relation should hold among
the exponents @10#:
a5
g21
b21 . ~3!
It is also straightforward to find that the rate of technological
progress is
r5
22g
a2g11
n11a2g21
n22g21
, ~4!where n is the size of the system ~number of agents!. For
large n, three different regimes can be considered.
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Several conclusions can be extracted from these expres-
sions. First, notice that there are two regimes where the rate
of technological advance increases with the size of the sys-
tem which suggests that large ensembles enjoy beneficial
‘‘scale effects,’’ i.e., large populations grow faster. It is in
these regions where one could expect an optimal advance
rate and therefore an optimal collective performance. In con-
trast, there is another regime where r is independent of n
suggesting a poorer cooperative dynamics.
Let us illustrate the general scenario by proposing a par-
ticular model endowed with the essential features requested
in the introduction. In this way we can investigate how the
distribution of technological advances depends on micro-
scopic details of the dynamics. In order to enhance transpar-
ency we have reduced the complexity of the model as much
as possible. We have considered a system formed by a popu-
lation of n agents defined on a periodic 1D geometry and
nearest neighbor interactions. Each agent is characterized by
a positive real variable ai(t) identified as the technological
level. The interaction with the neighbors is evaluated in
terms of the payoff function that we have chosen to be
c~a ,a8!5H a2k1~12e2(a2a8)! if a.a8,
a2k2~12e2(a82a)! if a,a8.
~5!
Thus, the base payoff obtained from using a certain technol-
ogy is assumed equal to a while the incompatibility costs
resulting from being too advanced or too backwards relative
to neighbors are parametrized, respectively, by positive fac-
tors k1 and k2. However, as we will see later, the overall
properties of the system only depend on the difference k
5k12k2.
The dynamics of the model has two main components. At
each time step a randomly selected agent is chosen to update
her technological level from ai(t21) to ai(t)5ai(t21)
1s˜ i(t) where s˜ i(t) is a i.i.d. random variable. The j5i
61 agent now has three options: either to maintain her level
or to adopt the level of one of her two neighbors. She is
assumed to take that action a5$a j ,a j21 ,a j11%, which maxi-
mizes her total payoff c(a ,a j21)1c(a ,a j11) @16#. This
process continues until no agent wants to perform any ad-
justment in her technological level. At each time step, the
size of the avalanche is
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where #$ % stands for the cardinality of the set in question,
and the total advance
H~ t ![(
i51
n
@ai~ t !2ai~ t21 !# . ~7!
Then, again one agent is updated randomly and so on.
Three different regimes are clearly observed in simula-
tions. Figure 1 shows the distribution of avalanches for dif-
ferent values of the parameter k. As we expected, below a
certain critical value all the avalanches are of the size of the
system. The technology advances at unison similar to a uni-
form front. Any perturbation in the system due to innova-
tions is incorporated immediately by the rest of agents be-
cause the cost of the update is very small. In the opposite
FIG. 1. Logarithm of the probability of having an avalanche of
size s vs. logarithm of the size s, for different values of k5k1
2k2. The length of the system is kept fixed at n54096. For k52
only events of size n are observed.situation, i.e., for large k, the avalanches are of small size
since the agents behave almost independently; this behavior
is close to the random deposition model well known in sur-
face growth @17#. For intermediate values of the coupling
parameter the distribution of avalanches follows a power law
for several orders of magnitude of avalanche sizes. The tech-
nological advance is also distributed according to a power-
law and assumption ~2! is also fulfilled as we show in Fig. 2.
Therefore, in this regime there is a clear absence of time as
well as length scales typical of a critical state @9,10#. We
have thus shown that different regimes ~A!,~B!,~C! appear in
this very simple model when changing k.
A deeper analysis of the model shows that it is possible to
extract analytical information about the location of the super-
critical regime. In particular, by only using local arguments,
it is straightforward to show that if the difference in techno-
logical level between two neighboring sites of a given agent
i, denoted by D5iai112ai21i , satisfies
k[k12k2,k*~D![
2D
12e2D
, ~8!
then agent i will always choose the highest local technologi-
cal level which in its turn can trigger additional updates in
neighboring sites @16#. In our case, where perturbations are
assumed uniformly random distributed in the interval @0,1#
and consequently the difference between agents is a continu-
ous variable, when k<k*(0)52 any local inhomogenenity
cannot be sustained and the system achieves a global syn-
chronized state where the technological level of all the
agents is exactly the same.
Now, let us consider the evolution of the macroscopic
observable r . Figure 3 shows the time evolution of r for
different values of k and a fixed system size n5512, whereas
Fig. 4 displays the stationary ~long run! values of r for dif-
ferent values of k and different system sizes. Two important
and appealing features must be singled out here. First, Fig. 3
shows that r grows monotonically over time, the systemFIG. 2. Relationship s2H for
different values of k. The system
size and the number of updates are
the same as those of Fig. 1. The
straight line has a slope 1.2.
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formance. No matter what is the initial condition the system
evolves to maximize the advance rate. This quantity is maxi-
mal when the stationary state is reached. As far as we know,
this is the first model where critical behavior is attained
through a process of self-organization that maximizes a cer-
tain macroscopic observable. Second, Fig. 4 indicates that r
is maximized within the critical region, at a point located on
its ‘‘lower edge’’ @18# ~i.e., within the narrow range where
kP @3,4#!. Notice that in the two limit cases k<2 and k
→‘ , H’s and therefore r is equal to the expected value of
the external random perturbation, 0.5 in our case. Further-
more, these figures clearly show that the advance rate de-
pends positively on the number of agents n stressing again
the faster growth of large economies. This fact is the moti-
vation to investigate also if the model presented in this work
accomplishes the relationship between exponents predicted
in the general scenario. We have indeed confirmed that the
scaling relation ~3! is fulfilled within numerical accuracy, by
FIG. 3. Time evolution of r as a function of k. The number of
updates, T, accounts for the slow time scale. The system size is kept
fixed at n5512. The result is an average over 100 independent
runs.fitting straight lines to the wide region where power-laws are
observed @16#.
In conclusion, we have presented here a general scenario
for the study of the technological evolution in a socioeco-
nomic environment. It is quite appealing to realize that in a
very general manner the framework described in this paper is
able to predict the existence of different regimes depending
on the cost associated to the improvement or diffussion of
technology and that these regimes can be computed directly
from a macroscopic quantity without specifying details about
the underlying microscopic dynamics and payoff functions.
Even more, we have shown through a simple model that
critical behavior is attained in a natural way through a pro-
cess of self-organization that maximizes a macroscopic ob-
servable: the advance rate.
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FIG. 4. Advance rate as a function of k, in a log-log scale, for
three different values of the length. For each run we have generated
64*n avalanches and averaged over 10 independent realizations of
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